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National Images, Trust and International Friendship: Evidence from Chinese Students 
 
Graeme A. M. Davies, Kingsley Edney and Bo Wang 
 
Abstract 
This article uses a new dataset of Chinese student attitudes to foreign affairs to analyse how 
perceptions of the United States, Russia, Japan, and North and South Korea affect respondent 
perceptions of international friendship with these states. Employing a mediation analysis we 
find that perceptions of national trustworthiness above all other images is the crucial factor in 
explaining cross-national friendship. These findings suggest that trust building measures would 
be a fruitful avenue for both reducing the likelihood of conflict in the region and fostering 
cooperative international interactions. 
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University students are one of the most active and vocal sectors of society on foreign 
policy issues in China. Understanding student attitudes to other countries is one of the keys to 
studying the interaction between Chinese public opinion and foreign policy. In this paper we 
use a new dataset of Chinese student attitudes towards foreign affairs to identify how 
perceptions of national attributes and behaviours affect respondent images of other states and 
specifically friend/enemy distinctions.  
 We conduct a mediation analysis to show that the image of national trustworthiness has 
the greatest influence on student perceptions of international friendship and that this is 
particularly pronounced when the foreign state in question is more generally perceived to be 
an enemy of China, such as Japan or the United States. Trust not only has a direct effect on 
friendship but also mediates a whole series of perceptions about other countries. Our findings 
show that trust and peacefulness are strongly correlated in responGHQWV¶PLQGV3HUFHSWLRQVRI
a foreign state being peaceful, powerful or similar to China appear to have a much smaller 
direct effect on perceptions of friendship. However, when we build a model that combines 
direct and indirect effects on friendship we see that trust and peacefulness are the key factors 
behind friendship, with the exception of the Russian friendship image, which is driven by trust 
and power.  
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  These results indicate that focusing on trust provides the most plausible mechanism for 
increasing perceptions of friendship with other states among Chinese students. Our study 
suggests that models that look only at direct effects of perceptions of peacefulness and 
similarity on friendship will miss a crucial pathway to friendship. We also find that respondents 
are sophisticated in their thinking about friendship, making more strategic alliance-based 
FDOFXODWLRQVZKHQHVWLPDWLQJ&KLQD¶VIULHQGVKLSZLWK5XVVLDFRQFHQWUDWLQJRQWUXVWDQGSRZHU
rather than peacefulness.  
The paper has five sections, with the first discussing previous research on image theory 
and reviewing past studies of Chinese images of foreign countries. The second proposes a 
theoretical framework for examining the key images of international friendship held by a 
section of the Chinese public. Section three discusses the new dataset, outlining research design 
and the variables used in the analysis. Section four examines the mediating effect of trust on 
friendship and the final section provides some general discussion. 
Previous Research 
Image theory provides a powerful tool to help us understand how elites make decisions 
about out-groups and how they view other states and peoples in the international system,1 
although image theory has generally not been used to investigate mass attitudes to foreign 
affairs. Images are an important way for individuals to sort multifaceted material that would 
become overly complex and unstructured without cognitive shortcuts.2 Images have both the 
potential to simplify decision-making but also distort it, potentially exacerbating conflict or 
leading to groupthink.3 Initial studies of images and international relations can be traced back 
to the work of Kenneth Boulding who applied image theory to elite decision-making.4 For 
Boulding a foreign policy image waVGHILQHGDVµWKHWRWDOFRJQLWLYHDIIHFWLYHDQGHYDOXDWLYH
VWUXFWXUHRIWKHEHKDYLRXUDOXQLWRULWVLQWHUQDOYLHZRILWVHOIDQGLWVXQLYHUVH¶5  
Boulding DUJXHV WKDW WKH WZR LPDJHV WKDWDUHEHVWSODFHG WRH[SODLQOHDGHUV¶ IRUHLJQ
policy decision-making are the hostility/friendliness of other states and their perceived 
strength/weakness.6 Later studies extended the strength/weakness image to take into account 
other potential stereotypes that might influence foreign policy decision-making. Cottam, again 
specifically examining elite decision-PDNLQJKLJKOLJKWVWKDWFHUWDLQZRUOGYLHZVRUµSHUFHSWXDO
PLOLHX¶ZLOOSUHGLVSRVHGLIIHUHQWLQGLYLGXDOVWRZDUGVDOWHUQDWLYHIRUHLJQSROLF\RSWLRQV7 For 
Cottam, there are four key images relating to threat, opportunity, culture and capability. 
Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi extended earlier studies into image theory by 
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developing a formal theoretical approach arguing that perceptions of structural relations 
between states result in emotions that influence the imDJHVDQGSHUFHSWLRQVRIRWKHUDFWRUV¶
behaviour.8 They examined four ideal typical images (enemy, ally, colony and degenerate) but 
suggested that further research needs to be conducted examining different images and different 
patterns, a suggestion we take up in our own research.  
Despite its central role in research into image theory in international relations, the 
concept of friendship has generally been overlooked or downplayed in the broader IR literature, 
with some notable exceptions.9 Berenskoetter argues that friendship is a means by which states 
FRQWURODQ[LHW\UHJDUGLQJWKHµRWKHU¶LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVJDLQUHFRJQLWLRQDQGFRPPLWWR
a vision of a common world based on a shared sense of virtue.10 Oelsner and Koschut 
distinguish strategic friendship, which involves mutual reliance and the alignment of interests 
and is often invoked in treaties and other international discourse, from the rarer normative form 
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO IULHQGVKLS ZKLFK LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ D GHHSHU DQG PRUH LQWLPDWH µVSHFLDO 
UHODWLRQVKLS¶EXLOWRQJHQXLQHWUXVWDQGPXWXDOFDULQJ11 While both forms of friendship are 
associated with bilateral inter-state relations, the mutual identification and trust upon which 
normative friendship is built can be seen not only between leaders and other representatives of 
the state, but also in other areas of interaction, such as transnational relationships involving 
businesspeople or civil society actors.12  
Although often marginalized in the academic literature, international friendship has 
been prominent in Chinese discourse on foreign relations due to the expectation of the Chinese 
side that the friendship image could help reduce the sense of threat associated with the 
FRXQWU\¶VULVLQJSRZHU13 Chinese officials use the language of friendship even when dealing 
with major rivals; Chinese IR scholar Yan Xuetong has argued that Sino-US relations are 
IXQGDPHQWDOO\XQVWDEOHGXHWRDPXWXDOSROLF\RIµSUHWHQGLQJWREHIULHQGV¶14 Chinese political 
and media discourse often emphasizes the bonds of friendship that exist between China or the 
&KLQHVHSHRSOHDQG WKHUHVWRI WKHZRUOG ,I&KLQD¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO IULHQGVKLS LV WR WDNHRQD
QRUPDWLYHIRUPWKDWJRHVEH\RQGMXVWWKHVWUDWHJLFXVHRIIULHQGVKLSGLSORPDF\RUDµIDOVH-but-
QLFH¶15 GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQUHODWLRQVZHZRXOGH[SHFWWRVHHLWXQGHUSLQQHGE\
genuinely friendly images of other states among sectors of the Chinese public that are interested 
or engaged with international affairs. Yet we know relatively little about whether the Chinese 
public really harbours friendly feelings towards other countries.  
While research on images is well developed when examining US public perceptions of 
other countries, the study of Chinese public perceptions are relatively underdeveloped. Recent 
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notable exceptions include a study conducted by Li et al., who investigated Chinese public 
perceptions of trustworthiness of South Korea and Japan.16 Van der Noll and Dekker have also 
examined individual attitudes towards the EU, the US, Russia and Japan.17 We build on these 
important studies by examining a more recent dataset on student attitudes towards friendship 
with a larger number of regional actors (the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea and 
North Korea (a significant omission from most previous studies)).  
 A lack of survey data meant that early research on Chinese images of foreign nations 
was based on elite interviews and descriptions in the mass media.18 Although research on 
Chinese foreign policy attitudes has progressed in recent years it remains limited by data 
availability. Due to the difficulty of carrying out independent, large-scale surveys on political 
topics in China, very little research into Chinese foreign policy attitudes is able to draw on 
statistically representative samples of the broad population. Instead, researchers like ourselves 
have to rely on surveys of students or scholars or online surveys, which are less problematic to 
conduct.19 A few large-scale surveys of public opinion have provided a snapshot of perceptions 
RI &KLQD¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK IRUHLJQ FRXQWULHV DOWKRXJK WKHVH VXUYH\V KDYH D PRUH OLPLWHG
range of foreign policy attitude questions than our own study and they too suffer from sampling 
bias resulting from the difficulty of conducting surveys in rural areas, which leads to the 
RYHUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI WKH YLHZV RI &KLQD¶V XUEDQ SRSXODWLRQ20 Other studies have focused 
specifically on middle-class views or the opinions of Chinese who either live overseas or have 
returned to China following a period abroad.21 Some research into Chinese foreign policy 
opinion draws on a wide range of sources, such as surveys, media content analysis, focus 
groups and interviews, but examines Chinese views of only one country or organisation.22 
Other research compares Chinese attitudes to multiple countries but uses only a limited range 
of independent variables (without controls for a range of other attitudes) such as whether 
respondents view specific countries as a threat to China or whether they have a positive or 
negative view of different countries.23 Some studies have more representative samples but are 
limited in the questions they can ask, while others are able to ask a wider range of questions 
about political topics (such as our own) but they have more limited samples. All of these 
research studies have weaknesses due to the incredibly difficult job of doing research on mass 
attitudes in authoritarian states.  
While it is certainly easier to conduct studies of Chinese students than to generate more 
representative samples of the opinions of the broader Chinese population, there are good 
reasons to focus on student opinion in China beyond the simple convenience of obtaining 
5 
 
student samples. Studying Chinese student images of other countries is crucial because students 
are an especially active and vocal demographic on foreign policy issues and form part of an 
urban, educated elite that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views as vital to cultivating and 
maintaining its popular legitimacy.24 Students play an important role in nationalist protests in 
China and pressure from student-led activism has a long history of affecting Chinese foreign 
policy. In 1919 May Fourth movement demonstrators prevented the Chinese delegation to the 
Paris Peace Conference from signing the Treaty of Versailles, while in 1967 radical Red Guards 
occupied and seized control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.25 Today nationalist protests 
represent an ongoing potential flashpoint in the relationship between public opinion and 
policymakers in China and the CCP pays close attention to the management of university 
campus-based activism on foreign policy issues.26 When international tensions have risen the 
Chinese authorities have sometimes threatened students with disciplinary action or taken other 
steps to discourage students from leaving campus in order to prevent student protests.27 
Obtaining a clearer picture of Chinese student opinions on foreign policy issues and the factors 
that influence friend/enemy distinctions will help contribute to our understanding of this very 
important sector of the Chinese public.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Images are important cognitive tools that individuals use when evaluating other states 
in the international system. The image represents a heuristic that aids decision-making 
especially when people have little direct evidence of the actions of other nations. Our choice 
of images are influenced by two factors. Firstly, drawn from the literature outlined above, we 
focus on images that have been consistently shown to influence decision-PDNHUV¶ DWWLWXGHV
towards war and peace. These include iPDJHVRIRSSRQHQWV¶VWUHQJWKWKHLUFXOWXUDOVLPLODULW\
and their perceived level of aggression.28 Secondly, we are interested in examining the extent 
to which macro-theoretical arguments about war and peace have micro-foundational 
underpinnings in individual perceptions. Again the images selected speak to theoretical 
arguments found in Realism which outline the relationship between power, conflict and the 
rise of China,29 the Clash of Civilizations that outlines the relationship between cultural 
differences and conflict,30 and finally security dilemma thinking, which examines beliefs about 
LQWHQWLRQVDQGSHUFHSWLRQVRIDQRSSRQHQW¶VOHYHORIaggression.31 
The final image selected relates to trustworthiness. Developments in the literature have 
shown trust to be a key factor in explaining cooperation between leaders and in mitigating the 
security dilemma.32 As discussed below we hypothesize that trust is a key mediator in 
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explaining how the other images affect perceptions of friendship. The theoretical framework 
outlined below will first discuss the hypothesized direct effects on friendship of images of 
cultural similarity, power and peacefulness. We then examine the impact of trustworthiness on 
friendship and how it mediates the effects of the other images in our model. In essence we will 
be outlining two mechanisms to explain the role images play in individual calculations about 
other nations: a direct mechanism and a mechanism mediated through trust.  
 
Images of Other Nations and their Direct Effect on Friendship. 
Firstly, we outline the effect of perceived cultural similarity on friendship perceptions. 
The Clash of Civilizations argument has received considerable attention in the academic 
literature but there is little evidence that cultural divisions lead to conflict between nation 
states.33 However, at the micro-level two studies have found that civilizational tensions 
increase individual support for military action against foreign states.34 
There are two distinct mechanisms that directly link cultural similarity to friendship: 
infrahumanization and homophily. Infrahumanization is the denial to an individual or group (in 
our case a nation state) some of the characteristics that make people human, rendering the target 
less than human.35 :KHQIRUHLJQQDWLRQVDUHYLHZHGDVFXOWXUDOO\GLVWDQWµRWKHUV¶WKH\PD\EH
more vulnerable to infrahumanization, making them difficult to relate to and as such 
undermining the capacity to view them as friends.36 Alongside the infrahumanizing mechanism 
WKHUHLVDOVRWKHHIIHFWRIKRPRSKLO\ZKLFKLVGHILQHGDVµOLNLQJRWKHUVZKRDUHSHUFHLYHGWR
EH VLPLODU WR RQHVHOI¶37 This literature argues friendship often results from shared gender, 
ethnicity or other socially constructed attributes that individuals identify with.38 Applying 
homophily research to national images we anticipate that images of similarity should increase 
individual perceptions of other nations being friendly and dissimilarity should increase 
perceptions of enmity. Both mechanisms suggest that images of cultural similarity should 
increase friendship perceptions. 
 
H1: Respondents who view nations as being similar to China will be more likely to perceive 
them as being friends of China.  
 
           Secondly, we outline the theoretical direct relationship between the power image and 
friendship. There are two plausible mechanisms that relate power to friendship: 1) in an 
anarchic self-help system the public suspect that powerful nations are enemies as they are more 
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able to take resources from China; 2) alternatively they might be perceived as a more capable 
ally who can help protect Chinese national interests.39 Johnston has argued that the strategic 
culture of the Chinese leadership has historically exhibited a tendency to view the world in 
realpolitik terms.40 If public thinking is in alignment with power preponderance theory, where 
Chinese dominance makes other states more compliant, thus reducing the risks of conflict then 
WKHSXEOLFVKRXOGYLHZZHDNQDWLRQVDVPRUHIULHQGO\DVWKH\DUHXQDEOHWRFKDOOHQJH&KLQD¶V
UHJLRQDO GRPLQDQFH DQG PRUH VXEVHUYLHQW WR &KLQD¶V QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV41 We therefore test 
hypothesis two to examine whether perceived weakness increases friendship or whether the 
relationship is contextual with powerful potential allies being more likely perceived as friends. 
 
H2: Respondents who view nations as being more powerful will be less likely to perceive them 
as being friends of China.  
 
Looking beyond national culture and power we also identify two images that could 
potentially influence national friendship images. We first look at peacefulness and then 
examine trust and its mediating effect. Images of peacefulness are important and relatively 
straightforward because they relate to decisions about war/peace and should therefore affect 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ YLHZV DERXW WKH IULHQGOLQHVV RI RWKHU VWDWHV ,QWHQWLRQV DUH LPSRUWDQW ZKHQ
considering friendship and speak to discussions about the security dilemma in the international 
relations literature.42 Perceptions of national peacefulness will also influence friend/enemy 
distinctions, with an aggressive nation being seen as an enemy of China, whereas peaceful 
nations will be perceived as friendly. We believe that there is a potential caveat to our 
understanding of the relationship between peacefulness and friendship that relates to North 
Korea and Russia. These states might be perceived as aggressive but not towards China, which 
is an issue that we probe in the results.  
 
H3: Respondents who view nations as being more peaceful will be more likely to perceive them 
as being friends of China. 
 
7UXVW¶V'LUHFWDQG0HGLDWLQJ(IIHFWRQ)ULHQGVKLS 
The trust image is critical to understanding public attitudes towards friendship. There 
is a growing body of research examining the concept and basis for trusting interactions in 
international relations.43 We anticipate that being able to trust another state is a critical factor 
influencing perceptions of friendship as it seems inconceivable that those individuals who 
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mistrust another nation can perceive it to be a friend. Trust is strongly correlated with friendship 
amongst individuals of all ages.44 If the other state is perceived to be trustworthy we expect 
that this will make the state appear friendlier, whereas if the state appears untrustworthy, it will 
be seen as a potential enemy.  
 
H4: Respondents who view nations as being more trustworthy will be more likely to perceive 
them as being friends of China. 
 
There are strong theoretical reasons for hypothesizing that trust mediates the image of 
similarity outlined above. Social psychology underpins the theoretical argument that cultural 
or social distance reduces trust.45 Trust is the key social lubricant that makes exchanges 
possible in social settings. Individuals tend not to trust blindly but rather look for cues that 
inform them about the trustworthiness of a stranger.46 If the stranger shares characteristics with 
the individual then they are more likely to be trusted, leading to what is called group-based 
trust.47 There are two possible bases for individuals trusting in-group strangers more than out-
group strangers. Firstly, people tend to have more positive evaluations of in-group members in 
their own right.48 Secondly, trust of in-group strangers is based on strategic calculations 
independent of positive evaluations of in-group members. Members of the same in-group have 
common interests and will therefore behave in a fair and reciprocal fashion simply to pursue 
these shared interests.49 Both reasons indicate that membership of the in-group should increase 
perceptions of trust, which in turn will influence perceptions of friendship. We therefore 
anticipate that cultural similarity directly affects friendship through homophily and by reducing 
infrahumanization but part of this of this process is driven by increasing the trustworthiness of 
the other state. It is much easier to be friends with a nation that appears trustworthy and much 
easier to be an enemy of a nation that appears untrustworthy. We hypothesise both a direct and 
mediated link between similarity and respondent perceptions of friendship between China and 
other nations in the international system. 
 
H5: Respondents who view nations as being similar to China will be more likely to perceive 
them as trustworthy and this will indirectly increase the likelihood of them being perceived as 
friends. 
 
We know of no theoretical literature to suggest that national power capabilities or 
peacefulness affect the trustworthiness of either individuals or states. State power may 
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influence perceptions of competence but is unlikely to make a difference to trust; rather, 
powerful states may be perceived as a threat to Chinese interests as discussed above. The 
peacefulness of a state is expected to have a direct influence on friendship and not be mediated 
through trust. As discussed earlier a state that is perceived to be peaceful is unlikely to be 
thought of as an enemy and the pathway to friendship is direct. 
 
Images and International Events 
In this study we focus on identifying and explaining how images of key national 
characteristics and behaviour affect beliefs about international friendship. While we do not 
explore the origins of the images that make up the independent variables and only examine the 
friendship image in terms of these other images, we acknowledge that all of the images we 
discuss here are not fixed and so any single survey result will inevitably reflect a snapshot of 
beliefs at a particular time. Although images tend to remain stable because people often 
discount new information that is inconsistent with their existing beliefs,50 it is possible that 
dramatic international events can affect images. In order to identify any major international 
HYHQWVWKDWPLJKWKDYHKDGDQLPSDFWRQRXUUHVSRQGHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVZHFRQGXFWHGDFRQWHQW
analysis of the front page and international section of the New York Times and China Daily for 
the month immediately prior to the survey.51 We found little evidence of any exogenous shocks 
that could have influenced Chinese public opinion during this period. However, two particular 
events are worth noting. First, a meeting between Xi Jinping and the Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe indicated a thawing of relations after a period of tension over territorial disputes. 
Second, a Chinese fisherman was shot and killed by the South Korean coast guard after being 
FDXJKWLOOHJDOO\ILVKLQJLQ.RUHDQZDWHUV$OWKRXJKLWLVSODXVLEOHWKDWRXUUHVSRQGHQWV¶views 
of South Korea and Japan shifted to some degree as a result of these events, both were linked 
to ongoing international disputes. The conflict with Japan, and corresponding cycles of 
warming or cooling relations, has persisted for decades, while the clash with South Korea was 
GHVFULEHGE\RQHMRXUQDOLVWDVSDUWRIDQµDQQXDOVHDEDWWOH¶WKDWKDVLQYROYHGYLROHQWLQFLGHQWV
over a number of years.52 Any impact on our respondents from these events should therefore 
be considered to be part of a continuous evolution of the relevant images that constitute our 
model rather than a significant shock to the dependent variable in the study. 
 
Data 
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We sampled students at four universities in three different Chinese cities. Two 
universities were in a major city in northern China, one was in a major city in central China 
and one was in a second-tier city in a coastal region of northern China, providing a broad 
geographical spread of responses from residents of larger and smaller urban centres. We 
devised an initial list of questions drawing on previous public opinion surveys conducted in 
Japan and the United Kingdom and then, mindful of the political subject matter of the research, 
revised this list in consultation with Chinese partners. We also conducted a focus group with 
Chinese students at a British university in order to check the Chinese-language survey used 
appropriate terminology and was comprehensible to students with no specialist knowledge of 
foreign policy issues. The final version of the survey instrument contained more than one 
KXQGUHGTXHVWLRQVDERXW&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQUHODWLRQV'DWDFROOHFWLRQWRRNSODFHEHWZHHQ2FWREHU
and December 2014 in the form of a convenience sample where respondents anonymously 
completed paper surveys that were distributed to and collected from them during their regular 
class hours. We collected 179 responses from University A, 83 from University B, 106 from 
University C and 246 from University D, for a total of 614 survey responses, of which 610 
provided usable data.53 Respondents included mainly undergraduates from a variety of degree 
programmes, including social sciences, physical sciences and more vocational courses as well 
as a small number (5.4 per cent of valid responses) of postgraduates. 
Variables 
The image variables were based on a six-point scale of opposite pairs for each country. 
The following questions for each country were asked of the respondents: 
 
µ+HUHDUHVRPHSDLUVRIRSSRVLWHVWKDWFDQEHXVHGWRGHVFULEHDFRXQWU\)RUHDFKSDLUSOHDVH
choose a point on the scale tKDW\RXWKLQNEHVWGHVFULEHVWKDWFRXQWU\¶ 
 
Friend: Enemy 0 to Friend 6. 
Trustworthy: Not at all trustworthy 0 to Trustworthy 6.  
Peaceful: Aggressive 0 to Peaceful 6. 
Powerful: Weak 0 to Powerful 6. 
Culturally Similar: Different from China 0 to Similar to China 6. 
 
There is the possibility of a potential multicollinearity problem if respondents are 
unable to conceptually distinguish between the different images in the model. However, after 
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running a series of Pearson bivariate correlation analyses we found no evidence of 
multicollinearity between the predictors.54 None of the variables for any of the models reaches 
the 0.7 level at which multicollinearity becomes a concern. In fact, the highest level of 
collinearity was .49, so the 0.5 threshold was never broken. Likewise the variance inflation 
factor tests across all of the models were significantly smaller than 10, never going higher than 
2, which also suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue. We are confident that the 
respondents on average understood the conceptual differences between the variables. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Although the data are not representative of the Chinese public as a whole, it is worth 
highlighting some interesting perceptions of other nations revealed by the data.55 Examining 
the data it is clear that there are significant differences in respondent perceptions of 
international friendship. Figure 1 presents mean scores for the dependent variable, images of 
friendship. A score greater than three suggests that the respondents on average perceive these 
countries as being friends and less than three places them in the enemy range. As we can see 
the respondents perceive a closer level of friendship with Russia with a mean score of 4.04. 
This is significantly greater than perceived friendship with North Korea, which is one of 
&KLQD¶VFORVHVWQHLJKERXUVDQGROGHVWDOOLHVDQGLVWKHEHQHILFLDU\RIVXEVWDQWLDOSROLWLFDODQG
economic assistance. This supports previous anecdotal observations and studies of Chinese 
Internet users that claim the Chinese public and elites are becoming frustrated with North 
.RUHD¶VRQJRLQJLQWUDQVLJHQFHDQGXQSUHGLFWDEOHLQWHUQDWLRQDOEHKDYLRXU56 However, it should 
be noted that our conceptual measure of friendship differs from previous studies that have used 
likeability heuristics as our measure examines individual perceptions of friend/enemy 
distinctions rather than likeable and unlikeable.57 We can conceive of a situation where a 
country is thought to be unlikeable due to its current behaviour or domestic characteristics but 
is still considered a friend based on a long shared history of friendly relations. Alongside this 
finding we also observe there is no clear difference in student perceptions of friendship between 
North and South Korea, with both of them having a score of 3.18. These results suggest that 
there is little stomach in China to support North Korea if it puts relations with South Korea at 
risk. What is concerning for regional stability is the level of antagonism towards both the 
United States (mean=2.78) and especially towards Japan (mean=1.51). If a confrontation 
between China and Japan took place we believe these results suggest that there would be 
significant student pressure to escalate the dispute and high levels of dissatisfaction with the 
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elite if they backed down in the face of a Japanese or US challenge. Figure 1 indicates that the 
student respondents clearly perceive there are differences in friendship levels between China 
and other nations in the international system. We find that the respondents on average perceive 
WKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG-DSDQDUH&KLQD¶VHQHPLHVDQGWKDW1RUWK.RUHDLVOHVVRIDIULHQG
WR&KLQDWKDQ5XVVLDZKLFKWKH\SHUFHLYHWREH&KLQD¶VFORVHVWIULHQG 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Generally, the respondents exhibit considerable cynicism about the behaviour of other 
nations.58 While the respondents predictably perceive Japan (mean=1.007) and the United 
States (mean=1.973) as untrustworthy, they also felt on average that North Korea 
(mean=1.928) is an untrustworthy partner as well. However, even Russia, the most trusted of 
nations, scored a mean of 3.271, only marginally putting it into trustworthy territory. Likewise, 
the respondents are generally fairly cynical about the peacefulness of the other states; only 
South Korea (mean=3.089) was considered on average to be marginally peaceful, with all of 
the other nations considered to be aggressive and Japan being viewed as the most aggressive 
nation (mean=1.123). There seems to be a reasonably high level of consensus that the United 
States is still a powerful country in the international system (mean=5.531) with Russia 
(mean=4.463) coming next. While it is fair to say that the respondents have a negative view of 
Japan, they still perceive it to be relatively powerful (mean=4.03), unlike North Korea, which 
ZDVIHOWWREHWKHZHDNHVWE\VRPHGLVWDQFHPHDQ 7KHULVNWR&KLQD¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK
ERWK-DSDQDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVWHPVIURP&KLQHVHUHVSRQGHQWV¶LPDJHVRIWZRSRZHrful, 
aggressive and untrustworthy states. This raises perceptions of threat from these two nations 
and if these images are found amongst current and future elites tensions in the region will be 
potentially exacerbated.  
Mediation Analysis: Trust and Friendship 
Using mediation analysis, we examine the key role that trust plays in mediating the effect of 
the other variables in the model. Mediation analysis presents the total effects of the predictors, 
broken down into direct and indirect effects.59 An unmediated ordered logit model does not 
allow for the possibility that the other variables in the model impact on friendship through trust, 
which we will demonstrate. As such we specify a model that estimates both the direct effects 
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of the variables on friendship and the indirect effects mediated through the trust image (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The above model outlines the theoretical relationship of the predictors on friendship, the extent 
to which these variables directly affect perceptions of the trustworthiness of other countries 
and the extent to which the effect of the predictors on friendship is mediated through trust. We 
DUH SODFLQJ D VWUXFWXUH RQ WKH GDWD VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKH RWKHU LPDJHV µFDXVH¶ WUXVW 1R
observational research design can eliminate endogeneity concerns. This is problematic as 
without using an experiment we are unable to establish a clear causal chain. The originality of 
this dataset means that we are also unable to conduct causal modelling over time.60 However, 
this dataset with its associated outputs will provide a baseline for comparison for future studies. 
In order to test the robustness of the trust mediation model, we conducted a series of 
unmediated ordered logit models (results available from the contact author) that did clearly 
suggest in a straight competition between all of the variables trust provided by far the strongest 
explanation for attitudes towards friendship. It is therefore not unreasonable to investigate 
whether trust is posterior to the less powerful predictors. Using a path model we are better able 
to identify the mechanisms that influence perceptions of international friendship. In essence 
we are now examining whether there is support for the trust based model of friendship and 
examine the factors that underpin that trust. 
Table I provides an overall summary of the empirical support for each of the hypotheses 
outlined in the theory section. To summarise we have found that a perception of similarity 
generally increases friendship (with the exception of South Korea) supporting hypothesis 1. A 
perception of power has no effect on friendship with the United States and North Korea, and 
increased rather than decreased perceptions of friendship with Japan, South Korea and Russia, 
leading to a rejection of hypothesis 2. Peacefulness and trustworthiness increases perceptions 
of friendship with all of the states, supporting hypotheses 3 and 4. In terms of trustworthiness, 
cultural similarity perceptions increase perceptions of trust in all countries supporting 
hypothesis 4 with the exception of the United States where it has no effect. 
 
Table I about here 
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While discussion of hypothesis tests gives us a broad understanding of the relationship between 
images and friendship, we seek to unpack our findings to examine the relative weight of the 
different images and the pathways through which images influence friendship. Next we 
examine in detail the mediation analysis for the different country image models (Table II).  
Rather than go into all of the coefficients for each of the models we will outline some broad 
findings and then provide a more detailed discussion of the direct and indirect effects of the 
variables presented on Table III. The model fit for all of the models is good, with chi-squared 
statistics all being significant at the 0.01 level.  Looking at the friendship model first we still 
find that across all of the models the effect of trust is both statistically significant and has the 
largest substantive direct effect on friendship perceptions. Our results demonstrate that trust is 
the crucial predictor of respondent perceptions of international friendship. Trust clearly has the 
potential to provide a causal mechanism for cooperation between states. When we look across 
the total effects of each of the predictors it is clear that trust on average has the greatest impact 
on the friendship image, with peacefulness coming second. Power and similarity have a roughly 
similar average effect, coming in joint third (with the exception of Russia where power has a 
bigger impact than peacefulness). It appears that Chinese students tend to judge friendliness 
based on how trustworthy and peaceful they perceive a state to be.  
Examining the influence of peacefulness we find that perceptions of peacefulness have 
DVLJQLILFDQWGLUHFWLQIOXHQFHRQ&KLQD¶VIULHQGVKLSZLWKRWKHUVWDWHVEXWWKHUHODWLYHLQIOXHQFH
of peacefulness differs, with it having a much smaller effect on perceptions of Russia or the 
United States than on perceptions of either Japan or South Korea. Where Russia is concerned 
we find that perceptions of power and trust have the biggest direct effect on friendship 
perceptions, whereas perceived peacefulness or similarity have weaker effects. These findings 
suggest friendship calculations with Russia are based on alliance characteristics of power and 
trust rather than non-aggression and similarity. Power image has the strongest direct effect on 
friendship for Russia, then South Korea, and finally Japan, whereas for the United States and 
North Korea it is not significant. Finally looking at cultural similarity we see that the effect is 
generally smaller than the other significant effects, but with the exception of South Korea it 
has a significant and direct effect on images of friendship with other states. 
 
Table II about here 
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When analysing the influence of the images on the trust mediator variable we find that 
generally peacefulness has the greatest influence on images of trust. Even without experimental 
evidence to validate causality, we are confident that trust and peacefulness are strongly 
FRUUHODWHGLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶PLQGV7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWVWUDWHJLHVWKDWUeinforce trust and signal a 
peaceful foreign policy, if they can reliably gain the attention of overseas audiences, could play 
a role in influencing how those audiences view other states in the international system. Being 
perceived as peaceful has the greatest effect on perceptions of trustworthiness (with the 
exception of Russia). Trustworthiness is statistically and substantively significant for all 
country image models and with the exception of South Korea has the strongest total effect on 
perceptions of friendship (Table III).  The power image has no statistically significant influence 
on trustworthiness for the United States. It does, however, influence images of trustworthiness 
for Japan (B=.070 (p>0.01)), North Korea (B=.334 (p>0.01)), South Korea (B=.168 (p>0.01)) 
and Russia (B=.179 (p>0.05)). It is particularly interesting to note that the power image of 
North Korea has the strongest direct effect on trust out of all of the countries, perhaps reflecting 
concerns that weakness and instability increase the likelihood that the North Korean state will 
behave duplicitously in order to survive and therefore undermine its trustworthiness. Finally, 
we examine the role of cultural similarity in trustworthiness. Across all nation images cultural 
similarity influences trustworthiness, with the exception of the perceived trustworthiness of the 
United States. 
 Next we disaggregate the total effects of the independent variables into direct effects 
that influence friendship and indirect effects that are mediated through trust that then influence 
friendship (Table III). Firstly, it should be noted that trust had the biggest total impact on 
friendship with all of the states except for South Korea where peacefulness (total effect=.359) 
was the key driver and trust came a very close second (total effect=.316). The model strongly 
suggests that trust is the major factor behind attitudes towards friendship amongst our 
respondents. Perceptions of peacefulness generally have the second biggest effect on attitudes 
towards friendship, with the exception of Russia where power perceptions are the key driver 
(total effect=.387). Similarity appears to be the third most important driver of friendship with 
the United States, Japan and North Korea, but is the least important for South Korea and Russia, 
where power and peacefulness are third respectively. What we see in terms of total effects is 
that in general trust and peacefulness are the key factors behind friendship, with the exception 
of the Russian friendship image, which is driven by trust and power. 
 
16 
 
Table III about here 
 
We should note that none of the variables are totally mediated through trust. The power image 
had no direct or indirect effect on friendship with the United States. Looking at images of 
Russia we find that trust makes very little difference to the role of power perceptions when 
calculating friendship at only 22 per cent. However, in some cases over 50 per cent of the effect 
of the independent variable is mediated through trust. Looking at the United States friendship 
image we see that approximately 62 per cent of the effect of peacefulness on friendship flows 
WKURXJKWUXVWZKHQUHVSRQGHQWVEHOLHYHWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULVSHDFHIXOWKH\VHH
it as more trustworthy and therefore perceive it to be a friend. 
When we examine images of Japan we see that peacefulness is one of the key drivers 
behind friendship but approximately 43 per cent of that effect is mediated by the trust image. 
With North Korea, power perceptions clearly influence trust and then trust influences 
friendship with again 75 per cent of the effect of the power image on friendship being mediated 
through trust. These models show that when mediation effects are not taken into account the 
effects of the independent variables are small because they are misspecified. It is crucially 
important to assess the role that these images of institutions and behaviour have in relation to 
trust. While the direct effects on friendship might be relatively small we have seen that this is 
at least partly down to the mediating role of trust.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
,QWKLVSDSHUZHSUHVHQWHGWKHUHVXOWVIURPDVXUYH\RI&KLQHVHVWXGHQWVDERXW&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQ
relations. This difficult-to-obtain data allowed us to further develop image theory and apply it 
to Chinese student perceptions of other states in the international system. This paper has 
therefore given us the first understanding of the underlying factors that influence student 
DWWLWXGHVDERXW&KLQD¶VSRWHQWLDOULYDOVDQGDOOLHV. The dataset provides future researchers with 
a baseline that can help us understand trends in Chinese attitudes towards security and 
international conflict. 
The results suggest that images of nations are an important part of how individuals view 
cross-national friendship. When we began this study we expected to find that images associated 
with similarity, peacefulness and trustworthiness would increase perceptions of friendship with 
other nations. Alongside the impact of independent variables on friendship we expected to see 
perceptions of similarity increase perceptions of trustworthiness. While we found that 
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similarity increased perceptions of friendship we also found that contrary to our expectations 
power perceptions increased perceptions of friendship with three countries and had a 
particularly sizeable effect on attitudes to friendship with Russia. We believe that in the Russian 
case this may be due to strategic calculations by the respondents, who view a powerful Russia 
as a useful ally for China. This could also be related to thHIDFWWKDWUHVSRQGHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQRI
Russian peacefulness had a relatively small effect on friendship in comparison to friendship 
with other states. In this case it seems plausible that respondents are unconcerned by Russian 
aggression because they see iWDVPRUHOLNHO\WREHGLUHFWHGDWWKRVHYLHZHGDV&KLQD¶VHQHPLHV
than at China itself. However, this is an area that merits further investigation. 
Although similarity, and in some cases power, may have influenced perceptions of 
friendship, this paled in significance when compared to the influence of perceptions of trust 
and peacefulness, with trust having the biggest overall impact by far. Trustworthiness is the 
key image associated with international friendship for our Chinese respondents. Trust not only 
had the greatest overall direct effect on friendship but was also an important mediator for the 
other variables. The models suggest that the perception of trustworthiness is the key driver 
behind respondent attitudes towards friendship with other states, although the effect size is 
different between those nations that are viewed as friends (smaller effect) and those that are 
viewed as enemies (much larger effect).  
:KLOH WUXVW DSSHDUV WR EH WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW LPDJH GULYLQJ &KLQHVH VWXGHQWV¶
perceptions of friendship with other nations, this study also indicates that it is crucial to develop 
a more nuanced understanding of the factors that contribute to the trust image, which may vary 
in different interstate dyads. Respondents have a sophisticated understanding of relations with 
different states, factoring power estimates into friendship with potential allies such as Russia, 
whereas with enemies behavioural images of trustworthiness and peacefulness are the key 
factors that will affect friendship and potential cooperation. Future research needs to explore 
how images of similarity, power, trust and friendship interact dynamically over time within 
specific relationships between China and other states in order to build on the initial snapshot 
we provide here.  
The association between peacefulness and trust we identify in this study is particularly 
significant in the case of Japan, which is strongly perceived to be an enemy of China by our 
UHVSRQGHQWV$OWKRXJKIRUGHFDGHV-DSDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOEHKDYLRXUKDVEHHQDmong the most 
peaceful of the major powers, its historical legacy of regional aggression undermines its image 
RI SHDFHIXOQHVV LQ &KLQD 7KH &KLQHVH SXEOLF¶V PHPRU\ RI WKH -DSDQHVH LQYDVLRQ DQG WKH
18 
 
atrocities it committed during this period are kept fresh by a state-led campaign in China to 
prevent the past from being forgotten.61 Although the data show that Chinese student 
perceptions of the trustworthiness and friendliness of other nations are quite negative across 
the board, Japan in particular faces a difficult task if it wishes to improve Chinese images of 
international trust and friendship between the two countries.  
Finally, our research also has important methodological implications for future studies 
of international friendship. We demonstrate here that mediation analysis is crucial to our 
understanding of the processes that influence individual attitudes towards international 
friendship. Direct effects models would have missed the potential pathway that channels the 
effect of similarity through trust and on to friendship, and likewise they would have clearly 
underestimated the sizeable contribution that trust makes to individual assessments of 
friendship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
Figure 1 
Chinese Student Perceptions of National Friendship 
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Figure 2 
Trust Mediation Model  
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Table I 
Hypothesis Testing Overview 
 
Hypothesis USA Japan North 
Korea 
South Korea Russia 
H1: 
Similarity 
Perception 
IncreasesFriendship 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅞ 
  
  
ᅛ 
H2: 
Power Perception 
Reduces Friendship 
  
  
ᅞ 
(no 
relation
ship) 
  
  
ᅞ 
(increases 
friendship) 
  
  
ᅞ 
(no 
relation
ship) 
  
  
ᅞ 
(increases 
friendship) 
  
  
ᅞ 
(increases 
friendship) 
H3: 
Peaceful Perception 
IncreasesFriendship 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
H4: 
Trustworthiness 
Perception 
IncreasesFriendship 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
H5: 
Similarity 
Perception Increases 
Trust 
  
  
ᅞ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
  
  
ᅛ 
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Table II 
Mediation Analysis 
 
Variable Model I 
US 
Model II 
Japan 
Model III 
NK 
Model IV 
SK 
Model V 
Russia 
Friendship 
Trustworthy .428 
(.032)** 
.406 
(.042)** 
.299 
(.037)** 
.316 
(.031)** 
.387 
(.033)** 
Peaceful .095 
(.033)** 
.185 
(.036)** 
.141 
(.036)** 
.245 
(.031)** 
.098 
(.032)** 
Powerful .089 
(.051) 
.106 
(.033)** 
.034 
(.042) 
.152 
(.033)** 
.258 
(.040)** 
Similar .101 
(.038)** 
.128 
(.031)** 
.128 
(.030)** 
.035 
(.028) 
.080 
(.028)** 
Constant .994 
(.311)** 
.265 
(.148) 
1.838 
(.112)** 
1.141 
(.125)** 
1.119 
(.200)** 
Trustworthiness 
Peaceful .352 
(.040)** 
.349 
(.033)** 
.369 
(.039)** 
.359 
(.040)** 
.267 
(.039)** 
Powerful -.029 
(.067) 
.070 
(.033)* 
.334 
(.046)** 
.168 
(.044)** 
.179 
(.035)** 
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Similar .083 
(.050) 
.128 
(.031)** 
.200 
(.034)** 
.149 
(.038)** 
.182 
(.035)** 
Constant 1.459 
(.401)* 
.114 
(.148) 
.003 
(.131) 
.369 
(.170)* 
1.241 
(.251)** 
N 
X2 
Log- 
Likelihood 
  
585 
350.4** 
-4455.3851 
585 
393.805** 
-4626.907 
547 
458.259** 
-4591.5109 
  
561 
431.209** 
-4309.6459 
  
557 
388.361*** 
-4515.3952 
 
Std. errors in parentheses *>0.05 **>0.01 
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Table III 
Direct, Indirect and Total Effects 
 
Variable Model I 
US Friend 
Model II 
Japan 
Friend 
Model III 
NK Friend 
Model IV 
SK Friend 
Model V 
Russia 
Friend 
Indirect 
Peaceful .151 
(.020)** 
.142 
(.020)** 
.110 
(.018)** 
.113 
(.0168)** 
.104 
(.017)** 
Powerful -.013 
(.029) 
0.029 
(.014)* 
.100 
(.018)** 
.053 
(.015)** 
.069 
(.021)** 
Similar .036 
(.022) 
.052 
(.014)** 
.060 
(.013)** 
.047 
(.013)** 
.071 
(.0149)** 
Direct 
Trust .428 
(.032)** 
.406 
(.042)** 
.299 
(.037)** 
.316 
(.031)** 
0.387 
(.033)** 
Peaceful 0.95 
(.033)** 
0.185 
(.036)** 
0.141 
(.036)** 
0.245 
(.031)** 
0.098 
(.031)** 
Powerful .089 
(0.51) 
0.106 
(.033)** 
0.034 
(.042) 
0.152 
(.033)** 
0.258 
(.040)** 
Similar 0.101 
(.038)** 
0.128 
(.031)** 
0.128 
(.030)** 
0.035 
(.028) 
0.080 
(.028)** 
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Total 
Trust .428 
(.032)** 
.406 
(.042)** 
.299 
(.037)** 
.316 
(.031)** 
.387 
(.033)** 
Peaceful .245 
(.035)** 
.327 
(.036)** 
.251 
(.035)** 
.359 
(.032)** 
.201 
(.034)** 
Powerful .077 
(.058) 
.135 
(.035)** 
.134 
(.042)** 
.205 
(.035)** 
.327 
(.045)** 
Similar .137 
(.044)** 
.180 
(.033)** 
.188 
(.031)** 
.082 
(.030)* 
.151 
(.031)** 
 
Std. errors in parentheses *>0.05 **>0.01  
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